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The benefits of education and of 
useful knowledge, generally diffused 
through a community, are essential 
to the preservation of a free gov­
ernment, 
Sam Houston. 
Cultivated mind is the guardian 
genius of democracy... . . It is the 
only dictator that freemen acknowl­
edge and the only security that free­
men desire. 
Mirabeau B. Lamar. 
'l'HE ARITHMETIC MEAN AS APPROXIMATELY THE 
MOST PROBABLE VALUE A POSTERIORI UNDER 
THE GAUSSIAN PROBABILITY LAW. 
BY EDWAR.D L. DODD. 
§1. OBJECT OF PAPER. 
The object of the present paper is to harmonize as much as 
possible the Principle of the Arithmetic Mean and the Gaussian 
Probability Law, viewed from the standpoint of probability 
a posteriori. By the principle of the arithmetic mean is under­
stood the statement that, if measurements are made of a mag­
nitude under like circumstances, the most probable value of the 
magnitude is the arithmetic mean or ''average'' of the measure­
ments. The Gaussian law will be explained later. 
That a lack of harmony exists has been known for a long 
time. • But experience has seemed to substantiate both prin­
ciple and law to such a high degree that an analysis of the dis­
crepancy between the two has not invited the serious attention 
of many mathematicians. 
In fact, a casual reader of many books on Least Squares or 
the Theory of Measurements might get the idea that the prin­
ciple could be deduced from the law or vice versa. It is not 
the intention here to condemn the suppression of intricate details 
in an elementary text-book. But the separate presentation of 
the principle and the law appears preferable to arr attempt to 
unite the two by pseudo-logic. 
Assuming the validity of the Gaussian Law, I have compared 
the arithmetic mean with several functions of the measure­
ments.+ These comparisons show the arithmetic mean superior 
*Bertrand: Calcul des Probabilit6s, Paris (1889), p, 180. "La 
r?lgle des moyennes, il importe d'insister sur ce point, n'est ni 
demontr6e ni exacte." 
tThe probability of the arithmetic mean compared with that 
of certain other functions of the measurements; Annals of Mathe­
matics, June, 1913, pp. 186-198. 
The error-risk of certain functions of the measurements; Mon­
atshefte fuer Mathematik und Physik, XXIV Yahrgang, 1913, pp. 
268-276. 
The error-risk of the median compared with that of the arith­
metic mean; Bulletin of the Universily of Texas, No . 323, March 
15, 1914. 
4 The University of Texas Bulletin 
to most of the functions considered, but not to all. To conduct 
these comparisons, direct probability was used. In this paper, 
on the contrary, probability a posteriori will be used. 
Poincare discusses • the relation between the law and the 
principle, making use of probability a posteriori and the so­
called ''probability of causes.'' He finds that the ''proof'' 
given by Gauss involves an assumption that the a priori prob­
ability is a constant. 
This assumption, while it may seem somewhat unwarranted, 
appears at first sight as the most simple and perhaps the most 
reasonable assumption to make. But the assumption happens 
to be at variance t with one of the most fundamental principles 
of the theory of probability; viz., that the sum of the proba­
bilities of the possible events shall be equal to one (unity), the 
symbol for certainty. On that ground we can not entertain 
such an assumption. 
A natural course is then to try to modify this assumption 
and to deal with an a priori probability which is nearly con­
stant, taking care to give this word "nearly" some mathemat­
ical precision. Again, it is natural to enquire if there are other 
assumptions concerning the a priori probability which will ap­
peal to us as in any sense reasonable. And in view of the inti­
mate relation which seems to exist between the Gaussian law 
and the arithmetic mean, it is natural to try to combine with 
the Gaussian law some postulates, as broad as possible, concern­
ing the a priori probability, which will lead logically to the 
arithmetic mean as at least a very natural and close approxima­
tion to the most probable value of the unknown. The object of 
this paper is, then, to investigate the nature of the a priori 
probability which permits a close relation between the Gaussian 
probability law and the principle of the arithmetic mean. 
'fhe meaning of probability a priori in a problem of this kind 
is a matter for reflection. I shall not attempt to define it. We 
are forced continually to deal with problems in which the ulti­
mate concepts are undefined and perhaps susceptible of consid­
erable latitude of interpretation. In geometry we deal with 
•calcul des Probabilites (1912), p. 169. 
tBulletin of the American :Mathematical Society, June, 1913, pp. 
479-482. 
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the straight line. But what is a straight line T We may try 
to shift the difficulty of defining a straight line to algebra and 
make use of the linear function ; but this does not define a 
straight line as geometrically conceived. Again a ''stretched 
string" is a good description; but it is not a definition. 
The notion of probability a priori will be developed in descrip­
tive fashion in the section which follows, and certain definitions 
and postulates given, also certain fallacies mentioned. Follow­
ing this will be the formal statement and proof of four theorems, 
involving various hypotheses concerning the a priori probability. 
This will be followed by a section on defective hypotheses, those 
which are inadequate to bring the Gaussian law and the arith­
metic mean into close relation. And a short discussion will 
follow this. 
§1. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS AND POSTULATES. 
A physicist learns that a meter-rod, that he has ordered, has 
been shipped to him. Supposing for the sake of simplicity that 
a meter is just 39.37 inches, what is the probability that the 
rod will be 39.37 inches long? What is the probability that it 
will be 39.38 inches long? Or 39.35 inches long? This problem 
may illustrate in a general way how an a priori probability may 
be conceived. The physicist has made no measurement of this 
rod ; in fact, he has not even seen it. His order may have been 
misunderstood, and something altogether wrong may have been 
sent him. Nevertheless, it would be generally admitted that he 
would be more likely to receive a rod between 39.30 and 39.40 
inches in length than a rod between 40.00 and 40.10 inches. And 
it is natural to attempt to get an expression for this a priori 
probability, rough though the approximation may be. 
It frequently happens that some hypothesis about the a priori 
probability seems almost necessary, to make a start in certain 
problems. But fortunately the influence of this probability often 
becomes ultimately negligible; so that, even though it has been 
poorly represented, the harm done is of a vanishing nature. 
Poincare >11 introduces an essentially unknown function to rep­
resent a certain probability in a problem on the roulette wheel 
*Poincar~. loc. cit., pp 148-162; see also p. 277. 
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and in a problem on the distribution of planets; and the influ­
ence of the function is practically nil. 
In view of the fact that the distribution of errors of measure­
ments and the deviations from the normal in biological observa­
tions follow with more or less approximation the Gaussian prob­
ability law, it is not unnatural to assume that the a priori prob­
ability may likewise be approximately Gaussian; for example, to 
assume that the probability a priori that the length of the meter­
bar lies between a and f3 is 
- k J/3 -k2(a-z)2(1) p -v; e dz, 
a 
in which e=2.718 .. . , a==39.37, and k, the measure of precision, 
depends upon the reputation of the firm for accuracy in con­
struction. The Gaussian law, as is well known, makes large 
errors less likely than small errors, and very large errors well 
nigh impossible. 
Many authors favor the use of a constant a priori probability. 
In the present problem, however, it is obvious that the prob­
ability that a rod between 1000 and 1001 inches long will be 
sent is not as great as the probability that a rod between 39 
and 40 inches will be sent. It would be rash to assert that the 
present problem is typical of all problems that arise. But the 
use of a constant a priori probability in certain cases is highly 
objectionable, especially when it refers to an unknown magni­
tude for which all real numbers are assumed possible. To show 
this, let the probability a priori that the unknown true value 
lies betwet'n a ~nd # be the integral of w(z)dz from a to {3. 
Now the symbol for certainty is unity. And so, as the unknown 
certainly lies between - oo and +oo, 
+~ 
(2) J \f/(z)dz=J. 
-oo 
As I have already * pointed out, this equation can not be sat­
isfied if '1t (z) is a constant. The failure to recognize this, lies 
*Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, loc. cit. 
at the basis of a fallacious deduction of the Gaussian law from 
the so-called principle of the arithmetic mean. The same fallacy 
underlies an argument for the reverse process, attempting to 
get the principle of the arithmetic mean from the Gaussian law. 
A still more objectionable fallacy, presented to accomplish 
this end, consists in confusing two distinct probabilities. The 
expression, 
h )" -h' [(z-m1 )'+...+(z-m 0 )'](3 ) <I> (z)= ( v:;;: e 
is first set up as the probability that if z is the true ...-alue the 
measurements m, m,, . . . mo will be made; and then the at­
tempt is made to regard this expression ( 3) as the probability 
that z is the true value, the measurements having been made. 
Then by setting the first derivative equal to zero, the result, 
m,+m,+... +mn 
z= 
n 
is obtained; and it is asserted that the average or arithmetic 
mean is the most probable value of the unknown true value. 
It is the object of this paper to arrive at the conclusion that 
the average is approxirnately the most probable value by assum­
ing that '1r(z) satisfies the requirement (2) and certain other 
natural conditions of a general nature, somewhat analogous to 
the conditions placed by Poincare upon the arbitrary functions 
in his roulette and planet problems. Different hypotheses will 
be made for -Ir(z) . It may seem that the only condition needed 
in addition to (2) is that '1t(z) be continuous, so that it would 
be practically constant in small intervals. But, as will be shown, 
this condition in no wise guarantees that the arithmetic mean 
will even approximate the most probable value. 
We do not here undertake to define a priori probability or 
indeed any kind of probability. A useful description of a prob­
ability may. be an ideal frequency. In the preceding illustration, 
perhaps the firm has the reputation of making its meter-rods 
a triffo too long. In place of a in (1), the physicist may put 
his guess, g, which may or may not be 39.37. In thiuking of 
p in (1) as an ideal frequency, we may have in mind that if. 
upon the n occasions the physicist guesses that the length of the 
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coming rod will beg, then in about pn cases it is to be expected 
that the length of the rod will be between a and (3. 
Concerning each measurement, mi, m:i • . . m,, it will be as­
sumed that it is subject to the Gaussian law, with measure of 
precision, k. That is, if a is the true value, and x==a--m, the 
probability that the error of a measurement to be made will lie 
between x1 and x 2 is 
h x. -h'x' (5) v;fe dx. 
x, 
Or, stated in the differential form, • the probability that the 
error x will be made,-that is, an error between x and x+dx,-is 
h -h2 x 2 (6) --e dx. 
i~ 
Then the probability that the n errors, x1 , x2 • • • Xn W'ill be 
made is 
(_h_)n -h'[x:+x:+••. +x~]d dy; e XnX1••• 
This resembles <l>(z) in (3) somewhat: but in (7), x1 is the 
actual error, a--m1 ; whereas, in(3), z-m1 is merely a residual 
with respect to z, where z is a candidate for recognition as the 
true value. 
Now let '11 (z) dz be the probability a priori that z is the true 
value, and let 
(8) F(z) w(z)<l>(z). 
Then, by Bayes' theorem, the probability a posteriori that z 
is the unknown true value, after the measurements have been 
made, is 
1(9) -F z)dz, 
c 
where c is the integral of F(z)dz from -oo to +oo. We seek 
•For the sake of brevity, the differential form will be sometimes 
used. From an inspection of Theorem III or Theorem IV the reader 
will be able to restate the first two theorems in the more cumbrous 
but more precise form. 
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the value Z of z which will make F (z) the maximum. Then, 
a posteriori, the most probable value of the unknown is Z. By 
this is meant that it will be more probable a posteriori that the 
true value will differ from Z by less than a small £ than that 
the true value will differ from any other real number by less 
than t. 
§2. FIRST HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE A PRIORI PROBABILITY. 
Let g be a guess at the true value, and let the a priori prob­
ability function be 
(10) + (z)=l/'11' e -k'(g-z)' 
Then from (8), 
_ k ( h )n -[lt' (ir--zf+h'~(z-m)']F(z)--= ~ e .v1T v1T 
Setting the first derivative equal to zero and solving gives the 
value Z of z, making F(z) the maximum. 
k'g+h'(m,+... +mn)(11) z k"+nh' 
A maximum actually occurs here; since the bracket above 
is a quadratic with the coefficient of z2 positive. Let M desig­
nate the arithmetic mean or average of the measurements; and 
divide the numerator and denominator in (11) by nh2 • Then 
(12) 
where 'r/1' 71 2, w and •T approach zero with increasing n. In 
fact, if it be postulated that M does not increase indefinitely in 
numerical value-and in practice this is usually the case-then 
Mw is an infinitesimal; and thus 
(13) 
where .,, approaches zero with increasing n. 
10 The University of Texas Bulletin 
Theorem I. Let the probabiiity a priori that the unknown 
t'r'!te value is z be • 
where g is any guess at the unknown. Let the probability that 
the error of a measurement to be made will be x be 
h -h2 x 2 i1:;;:-e dx. 
Then, a posteriori, after n measu1·ements with arithmetic mean 
M have been made, the most probable value of the unknown is 
where w and a appronch zero with increasing n. 
Disc1ission. If the tangent of an angle near 90° is being 
measured, the condition for (13) may not be satisfied. To illus­
trate further by an example, suppose that the measurements 
turn out to be the odd integers in natural order: m1=l, 
m2=3, m3=5, etc. Then in (11), m 1+m2 + ... +mn -n2 ; 
and M n. Suppose furthermore that g= -1, and that 
h=l=k. Then 
z n-l=M-1. 
Thus M-Z=l; and so this difference is not an infinitesimal. 
In general, k and h in (11) are not equal. In place of the 
guess g in (10) a perliminary measurement m may be made; 
and thus m would replace g in (10). This may seem at first 
sight to make k equal to h, so that by (11) Z would become the 
exact average of the (n+l) measurements. But even with a 
measurement m there is no justificatian for making k in (10) 
equal to h. The probability that z is the true value after a 
measurement m has been made, is entirely distinct from the 
probability that the measurement m will be made if z is the 
true value. The failure to recognize the distinction between 
a "probability of cause" and a direct probability has been the 
source of many fallacies. The distinction can be brought out 
*See ( 5) and (Ii) and coresponding foot-note. 
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clearly by urn problems where the exact probability can be com­
puted, under certain hypothese,s. The probability that an urn 
contained two white balls and two black balls if a white ball 
and a black ball have been drawn, is quite different from the 
probability that from an urn containing two white balls and 
two black balls a white ball and a black ball will be drawn. 
§3. SECOND HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE A PRIORI PROBABILITY. 
By differentiating F( z) in (8), we obtain 
(14) F' (z)=<I>(z)[w' (z)+'l' (z) ~ -2h'(nz-:Sm)} J 
Let f (z) be the function obtained by dividing the bracket 
in (14) by -2h 2n'lt(z). Then 
'1t' (z)(15) f(z)=z-M 2h2n'l' (z) 
Now F'(z)=O provided f (z) =O. To make .f(z) vanish when z 
is nearly M, we naturally impose some condition to make the 
last term in ( 15) negligible with increasing n. 
THEOREM IL Let the probability * a priori that the 1mknown 
true value is z be \JI(~) dz, where 
!>It' (z) !<Kw (z) 
for all values of z, K being some constant. Let the probability 
that the error of a measurement to be made will be x be 
h --h2x2 
/ ;e dx.
1
Then, a posteriori, after n measurements with arithmetic mean 
M have been made, the most probable value of the unknown is 
M+a, 
where u approathes zero with increasing 11.• 
The hypothesis excludes the possibility of 'It' (z.) becoming 
infinite; and thus 'It (z) is continuous. Furthermore by hypoth­
*It is further assumed in all the. theorems of this paper that 'It (z) 
must satisfy ( 2) to properly represent probabili ty; and that 
'It (z) is not negative, for we do not recognize negative probability. 
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esis '1t (z) can not become zero; thus the denominator in (15) 
is not zero. 
The function given in (10) does not satisfy the requirements 
of Theorem II ; since 
(16) +' (z)=[2k2{g-z) ]'1t(z). 
There are, however, simple functions which satisfy these require­
ments and which have a graph closely resembling the common 
probability curve-see (6) and (10)-and which satisfy (2) 
For example: 
I(1.7) 
'1t (z) 1T (1 +l'z')' I>o. 
§4 THIRD HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE A PRIORI PROBABILITY. 
In the theorem about to be stated, the special condition to be 
placed upon -.V' (z) is suggested by (16). The differential form 
of statement will now be laid aside. 
THEOREM III. Let the probability a priori that the true value 
lies between aand a+8 be 
where v(z) is positive, except perhaps at isolated points; and 
(18) 
c1 and c2 being positive constants. Let the probability that the 
error of a measurement to be made will lie between X1 and X2 be 
x, h' • 
h_J c- xdx
v'I!' 
x, 
Then after n measurements with arithmetic mean M have been 
made, the probability a posteriori that the true value lies be­
tween aand a+s is greatest when 
(19) 
where lim w=o and lim u=0 uniformly. 
n=:o, l'l=o n=oo, 8=o 
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Proof. By Bayes' theorem, the probability a posteriori that 
the true value lies between a and a+8 is 
l a.+8 
(20) P=-zJ F(z)dz. 
a 
The abridged form of this statement was given in (9) For 
brevity set 
(21) ( =_s_
• 2h'n 
These approach zero with increasing n. 
Pirst, suppose that '11(z) >0. Then from (15), f(z) <O pro­
vided 
(22) 
because of (18) and (21). This may be written 
(23) 
Now if M>O and the ('s are small, this will be satisfied if 
M-((24) z< I+(,·; 
whereas if M~O, (23) will be satisfied if 
M-(,(25) z --­< 1-(, 
In place of (24) and (25) we may write simply 
(26) 
where is an infinitesimal. Hence if z satisfies ( 26), f ( z) (3 
will be negative, F'(z) will be positive by (3), (14) and (15), 
and F(z) will be an increasing function of z. Hence P in (20) 
can not take its largest value, for a given 8, if 
(27) 
This 8 can be made as small as we please. Likewise it can be 
shown that P can not take its largest value when 
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(28 
where £4 is an infinitesimal. But with 3 fixed, P is a contin­
uous function of a and hence takes on its maximum. Hence 
(191 follows from (27) and (28). Here wand" approach zero 
11niformly; for from (21) , the rapidity with which £1 and £2 
approach zero does not depend upon the magnitude of M. In 
Theorems I. and II., w and " likewise approach zero uniformly. 
Suppose now that w(z)=O at some isolated points. Then by 
(18) and (14) F'(z)=O at these isolated points. This will not 
affect the character of F (z) as an increasing function or as a 
decreasing function. 
To see that (18) is not a superfluous condition let 
(29) w(z)=Ce-lz"\, 
where C is chosen to satisfy (2). The graph of (29) is a 
curve symmetrical with respect to the '' Y axis,'' has its maxi­
mum at z--0, has just one point of inflection on each side of the 
Y axis, and otherwise resembles the usual probability curve (10), 
with g=O. Then by (8), if h=l, 
_ ( 1 )n - z' -~(z-m)'(30) I· ( z )=C ]/; e 
If now the measurements turn out to be the odd integers, 1, 3, 
5, ... then ~m=n2 , and F(z ) takes its maximum when 
z=(l/ 3)1\!I(\17-1). Thus (19) is not satisfied; nor is (18). 
It will be noticed that Theorem I. is a special case of Theorem 
III.; but Theorem I. was given first, because of simplicity of 
development. 
§5 FOUR'l'H HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE A PRIORI PROB­
ABILITY. 
'l'here are certain cases m which measurements must lie be­
tween two constants. If we accept the most elementary con­
ception of an angle, the angle must lie between 0° and 180° 
The tangent of this angle, however, may have any real value 
positive or negative. But even if we are measuring the tangent 
of an angle, there would usually be an interval, from b, to b2 , 
15 The Most Probable Value A Posteriori 
in which the average M would in practice be. To postulate that 
M must lie in (b1 , b2 ) would be contradictory to the Gaussian 
law. And so the theorem to be given applies in strictness to 
the case where M does lie in (b1 , b2 ), rather than to the case 
where M must lie in (bii b2 ). 
THEOREM IV. Let the probability a priori that the true 
valile lies between a and a+8 be 
a+8J 'JI (z)dz, 
a 
where w(z) is limited for all V'alues of z; and has a positive min­
imum in some interv·al (bu b2 ), or at least in that part of 
(b1+E, b2--t:) which remains when a finite number of sub-inter­
V'als of the form (~-E, ~-t-E) are removed, with Esmall at pleas1tre. 
Let the probability that the error of a measurement to be made 
will lie between x 1 and x 2 be 
x, 
Then after n measilrements with arithmetic mean M have been 
made, the probability a posteriori tha.t the true v·alne lies be­
tween a and a+8 is greatest when 
a=M+o 
where lim a=o 1miformly in (b 1 , b2 ) provided that M continues 
n=oo, 8=o 
to lie in (b 1, b2 ). 
Proof. J..Jet v11 v 2, • • • Vn be the residuals of the measure­
ments with respect to M; that is, let v 1-M-mn etc. Then 
z-m1=z-M+v1, etc.; and, since lv o, (3) becomes 
. ( h )n -h'lv'[ -nh'(z-M)'](31) <l>(z)= --= e ev 7f 
This shows, even more simply than (3), that <I>(z)takes its 
maximum when z=M, and is an increasing function when 
z<M and a decreasing function when z>M. We wish 
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to show that, under the conditions of the hypothesis, <I>(z) can, 
when n is large enough, force its own point of maximum M 
upon the product F(z) in (8) and so upon P in (20), to as 
close an approximation as we please. From (31) it follows that 
cI>(z+t) -nh' [tCz-M)+ie;].(32) <I>(z+f) e 
In particular, 
ct> ( M+t) -in~;t: • 
....-,----,-=e(33) 
<I>(M+f) 
Now, by hypothesis, '11 (z) is limited; that is, there is a constant 
K such that '11 (z) <K. By hypothesis also, if z lies in the 
interval from b1+{ to b2-t with sub-intervals of the form 
(~-2, '+ l.) removed, there is a positive number T such that 
w(z) >T. 
Suppose, first, that M differs from b1 , b2 and every ~ by at 
least t:. Now take n in (33) large enough so that 
<I>_(_M_+_t) <-T <I> (M--{) T (34) ----<­<I> ( M +-t) K ' <J>(M-t) K · 
Then 
(35) Kif> (M-i) <T<I>(M-f). 
But <I> (z) is an increasing function when z<M. Hence by 
(35, if z1 is any value of z<M~j and z2 is any value of z 
between M~~ and M, then 
w ( z,) <I> (z,) <K<I> (M-j) <T<I> (M--f) <w (z.) <I> (z,). 
Thus F(z1 ) <F(z2 ). Hence, if we take any particular 
8<f , the maximum value of P in (20) can not occur when 
a<M-t:. Likewise from (34) it follows that the maximum of 
P can not occure when a>M+t:. But with a chosen 8, the in­
tegral P is a continuous function of a; and hence P takes on its 
largest value when a lies between M-t: and M+t:. 
17 The Most Probable Value A Posteriori 
If, in particular, M~+e:, then by (34), 
w(e +e: +f) T 
(36) <­w(~+e:+ -~- ) K 
But from (32), whatever be the value of M, 
w(~+e:+t) -nh'[t( ~+(-M)+H'), 
e 
'11 ( ~+e:+t) 
and decreases with decreasing M. Hence (34), being satisfied 
when M~+e:, is satisfied a fortiori, when M<~+e:. Hence, 
when M <~+e:, and n and 8 are chosen as specified above, P 
can not take its maximum when a>~+2e:. And likewise when 
M>e-e:, P can not take its maximum when a<~-2e:. Thus 
if M falls between ~-t: and ~+e:, P takes its maximum when a 
lies between ~-2e: and ~+2e:; and la-Ml<3e:. The reasoning 
is analogus if M falls near b1 or b2 • 
§6. FOUR DEFECTIVE HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE A PRIORI 
PROBABILITY. 
Four hypotheses will now be mentioned which are untenable 
or artificial or inadequate. 
1. Each real number is equally likely a prior£ to be the 
true value. 
This makes \Jt(z ) a constant, and (2) can not be satisfied. 
2. Each real number in a certain interval (b1 b2 ) is a priori 
equally likely to be the true value, and it is impossible for the 
true value to lie outside this interval. 
I have given an example • for which this hypothesis is nat­
ural. But in the general case it appears artificial to postulate 
that the a priori probability drops suddenly to zero at the 
ends of an interval, when these ends can be at best only hazily 
imagined. 
Even if we adopt this hypothesis, it would not follow that 
the arithmetic mean M is the most probable value of the un­
known, without the addition proviso that M lies in (b 1 , b2 ) . For 
if '1'(z)==O outside (b1' b2 ), then by (8) the probability a pos­
*Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, loc. cit. , p. 481. 
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teriori that the true value lies outside ( b1 , b2 ) is also zero. Thus 
the most probable value of the unknown could not be outside 
(b1 , b2 ); whereas the Gaussian law permits M to have any 
value whatever. 
3. The a priori probability is practically constant in small 
intervals,-or, as we may wish to express it, '11 (z) is a contin­
uous function of z,-and all real numbers are possible values 
of the unknown true value. 
These conditions are satisfied by w(z) in (29); and hence are 
inadequate. 
4. The a priori probability is continuous, and is zero outside 
a certain interval. 
The supposition that w ( z) ==() outside (b1' b2 ) leads to the 
defect mentioned under No. 2. 
§7. FOUR TYPES OF A PRIORI PROBABILITY. 
In a given case there may be a strong probability that the 
arithmetic mean M will not increase indefinitely, even though 
something like the tangent of an angle is being measured. Never­
theless instruments may be subject to a progressive change due 
to a change in temperature. Or, indeed, an increasing set of 
measurements may be the result of mere chance as we usually 
understand the term. If a gambler loses in one night as much 
money as he has won previously in a year, he may well suspect 
that the dice are loaded. And an experimenter may well sus­
pect that his instruments are suffering from some ailment, if 
his measurements persist in increasing. But in both cases it 
may be simply a run of bad luck. 
It may seldom be clear just what type of a priori probability 
to postulate; but the theorems just given and subsequent dis­
cussion permit us to distinguish four types of a priori proba­
bility in accordance with the ease with which this probability 
allows itself to be eliminated when M increases indefinitely., 
thus departing indefinitely from any value which a priori may 
be the most probable value of the unknown. 
1. The weakest w ( z) , that has been mentioned as permissible, 
is given by (17). This has no power of resistance, and its 
influence is evanescent with increasing n. 
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2. The £unction (10) has a greater power 0£ resistance. An 
example was given a£ter Theorem I., in which g=-1 and 
Z 111-1. The £unction (10) can clip off a constant-in the 
example, unity-£rom the arithmetic mean, be£ore this is pre­
sentable as the most probable value of the unknown. 
3. 'l'he function (29) is still stronger. In the example 
given, it permits a number only about 55% of the arithmetic 
mean to come forth as the most probable value. But even this 
function is not absolutely prohibitive of a large most probable 
value. In spite of its strong preference £or zero as the value 
of the unkonwn, it acknowledges the possibility of any value; 
and the persistent increase of M forces up the most probable 
value. 
4. A function absolutely prohibitive of a most probable 
value outside an interval (b 1 , b2 ) can be formed by making 
w(z)=O outside (bu b2 ). This follows from (8), (9), and (20). 
As long as M remains in some interval (b1 , b2 ), both functions 
(10) and (29) and in general the w(z) just mentioned exert a 
vanishing influence upon the most probable value, by Theo­
rem IV. 
With large values of M, it is easy to see why (29) should be 
more stubborn than (10), since when z>k2 , 
-z' -k 2z' 
e <e 
and diminishes much more rapidly as z increases. 
§8 DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ARITHMETIC MEAN. 
The four theorems of this paper present the arithmetic mean 
as a natural approximation for the most probable value, from 
the standpoint of probability a posteriori, under certain broad 
conditions. It has not been proved that the arithmetic mean 
is the best approximation. Actual comparison of the arithmetic 
mean with the median and other functions of the measure­
ments from the standpoint of probability a posteriori may per­
haps be made; but these comparisons conditioned by an un­
known a priori probability would seem less conclusive than 
comparisons made from the standpoint of direct probability. 
One of the strongest rivals of the arithmetic mean just now 
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is the median; because of its frequent use in statistical work. 
The median is more easily ascertained than the arithmetic mean. 
We have simply to arrange the measurements in the order of 
their magnitude and pick out the middle one,--the number of 
measurements being odd. If X is an approximation for the 
true value; and ~ (X-m) 2 is a minimum, then X is the arith­
metic mean; whereas if ~ I X-m l is a minimum, then X is the 
median. The median has some of the same characteristics as 
the arithmetic mean. Under the Gaussian law, the probability 
that the median of n measurements will differ from the true 
value by less than any preassigned positive f, approaches unity 
(certainty) when the number of measurements increases in­
definitdy. * P11rthermore, it ltas not been substantiated empir­
ically that the arithmetic mean is better than the median and 
other fmictions of rneasurernents that have been 1tsed. 
When the theory of probability was in its infancy, the arith­
metic mean had the support of tradition ; and it was natural 
enough for mathematicians to try to inject into the theory of 
probability the postulate that the arithmetic mean is the most 
probable value. With the growth of the theory of probability­
based largely upon the careful study of distributions suggested 
by games of chance-the postulate that the arithmetic mean is 
the most probable value comes to seem more and more gratuitous. 
To set up such a postulate now appears to be putting the cart 
before the horse. Much better it is to try to use the information 
gathered from the study of probability to discover what is the 
best function , if there be a best function. 
It has not been the obj ect of this paper to compare functions 
nor to enthrone the arithmetic mean. But the object has been 
to show that th e arithmetic mean has at least the distinction 
of issuing· from the Gaussian law as a very naforal approxima­
tion for the most probable value a posteriori, under broad and 
tenable hypotheses concerning the a priori probability. 
*This may be proved by using equation (14). Anna ls of Mathe­
matics, Joe. cit. , p . 195, and showing that the probability that the 
median will differ from the true value by more t han € • approaches 
zero. 

